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On Visser’s Effects, Control, and Weak Implicit Agents
Abstract
Landau (2013) and van Urk (2011, 2013) use data involving VisserÕs Generalization to argue that (a) the
understood thematic subject of a passive verb is syntactically projected as a weak implicit argument
(WIA) and (b) antecedent resolution in obligatory control (OC) structures is determined by the syntactic
processes of Agree and predication. This paper further examines sentences involving control and
passivization and provides five areas in which improved empirical coverage is achieved under an account
that makes the opposing assumptions, namely, that the external argument of a passive is syntactically
unprojected (only being interpretatively available via existential binding or meaning postulates, as argued
in Parsons (1990), Lasersohn (1993), and Bruening (2013)) and that the reference of PRO is determined
post-syntactically, by a Bare Output Condition, as most recently suggested, e.g., in Reed (2014: Ch. 7). 1
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On Visser’s Effects, Control, and Weak Implicit Agents
Lisa Reed*
1 Introduction
This paper examines sentences in which control interacts with passivization either in the form of a
personal passive, such as the French example in (1), or an impersonal passive, as in (2).
(1) Le jeu a été joué [en PRO tirant le levier sur le côté de la machine].
the game has been played while
pulling the lever on the side of the machine
‘The (slot) game was played by pulling the lever on the side of the machine.’
Parallel English data first observed in Roeper (1983, 1987)
(2) Il a été proposé/décidé [de PRO fonder une
nouvelle nation].
it has been proposed/decided of
to.found a
new
nation
‘It was proposed/decided to establish a new nation.’
Parallel English data first observed in Manzini (1983:427)
Landau (2013) and van Urk (2013) argue that these types of sentences support their two hypotheses in (3a-b), namely, that the understood subject of a passive verb is syntactically projected
as a weak implicit argument (WIA), and that the reference of PRO in contexts of obligatory control (OC) is primarily determined by Agree and predication.
(3) a. The understood thematic subject of a passive verb is syntactically projected, as originally
suggested in Government-Binding (GB) terms in Roberts (1987), but, more recently, in
Minimalist terms in Landau (2010, 2013) and van Urk (2011, 2013).
b. The referent of obligatorily controlled PRO (PROOC) is primarily determined by the
computational system, as originally proposed in transformational terms in Rosenbaum
(1967) and more recently, in Minimalist terms, in Landau (2010) and van Urk (2013).
In this paper, I will use the same types of data to argue in favor of the opposing views in (4ab), namely, that the understood subject of a passive verb is not syntactically projected and that the
reference of PRO is determined at Logical Form (LF) by a Bare Output Condition (BOC).
(4) a. The understood thematic subject of a passive verb is syntactically implicit, as originally
argued in GB terms in Williams (1985, 1987), Chomsky (1986), Rizzi (1986), Brody &
Manzini (1987), Roeper (1987), and others, and, in Minimalist terms, in Bruening
(2013).
b. The referent of PRO is determined at the syntax-semantics interface by some version of
a Theory of Control, as originally suggested in transformational terms in Chomsky &
Lasnik (1977), and, in Minimalist terms, in Reed (2014).
The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines key aspects of the theories of control
and passivization assumed by Landau, van Urk, and myself, the goal not being to exhaustively
compare and contrast the two approaches, but rather to make it clear where we are in agreement
and where we are not. Section 3 then examines five areas in which these two theories make opposing empirical predictions. Section 4 provides a very brief summary of the findings.

2 Points of Agreement and Contention
The analyses of control developed in Landau (2010, 2013), van Urk (2011, 2013), and Reed (2014)
*I wish to thank Marc Authier, Benjamin Bruening, and the audience at the 41st Annual Penn Linguistics
Conference for helpful comments, suggestions, and native speaker judgments. Sincere thanks as well to Ava
Irani and Milena Šereikaitė for publishing this work online. All remaining errors and omissions are my own.
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share a number of features that make these theories much more similar to each other than they are
to alternative movement or implicit argument approaches to control. More specifically, we agree
on each of the three points summarized in (5). Given space constraints, the focus in this section
will be on just the second and third hypotheses. Namely, (5b) makes it clear that we share the view
that PROOC is the “default,” found in any syntactically transparent context, while non-obligatorily
controlled PRO (PRONOC) is attested “Elsewhere.” Importantly, and as is indicated in (6a-b), what
constitutes a transparent or an opaque domain does differ under the two theories. While Landau
and van Urk assume that an embedded ForceP/CP does not create an opaque domain, I assume
that it does.
(5) a. PRO is licensed by specific bundles of features (Chomsky & Lasnik 1995).
Landau (2000, 2013) and van Urk (2013):
PRO is licensed by any T that is not associated with interpretable [+T, + Agr] features.
Reed (2014: Ch. 6):
Following Bowers (2002), PRO is licensed only if there are no functional heads with
unvalued phi-features that would have to undergo Agree with an inherently phiassociated nominal (which PRO is not).
b. The computational system determines the relative distribution of
obligatory and non-obligatory readings of PRO (Chomsky 1980: 33).
Landau (2013), Reed (2014), and van Urk (2013):
PROOC is the “default,” found in syntactically transparent contexts.
PRONOC is attested “Elsewhere,” i.e., in syntactically opaque contexts or in structurally ambiguous contexts in which the OC derivation results in semantic
anomaly.
c. The reference of PRONOC is determined by pragmatic factors that include logophoricity (Williams 1992), topicality (Bresnan 1982), and genericity (Postal
1970).
(6) Contrasting Views of Syntactic Opacity: The Status of ForceP
Landau (2013) & van Urk (2013):
NOC readings only arise whenever predication and Agree are either both structurally
blocked or when their operation results in semantic anomaly. I.e., ForceP does not
create an opaque domain for predication or Agree.
Reed (2014):
The Bare Output Condition (BOC) in (7) determines the antecedent of PROOC.
I.e., ForceP does create an opaque domain.
(7) By default, PRO must take as its antecedent a c-commanding implicit or explicit argument
within the superordinate clausal domain that immediately dominates the clause in which it
appears, with lexical specifications ruling out potential antecedents and ForceP constituting
a phase that “closes off” the search space. If there are no c-commanding potential antecedents or the search space is closed off by ForceP, PRO is assigned the index arb and its phifeature specifications are logophorically determined. Reed (2014:302)
It is important to bear in mind that Landau and van Urk are firmly committed to the view that
control complement clauses uniformly take the form of ForceP (formerly, CP).1 For one thing, this
is what allows them to accommodate Partial Control (PC) in examples like (8a). Namely, the head
of ForceP, which is unspecified for number, “mediates” the control relation and this is what allows
PRO to differ in semantic number from its controller.2 As will be made clear in Section 3.4, indirect questions further entail this assumption under their system.

1

In more recent work, Landau (2015) modifies this assumption slightly, analyzing Exhausative Control in
terms of FinP complementation coupled with predication and Partial Control in terms of ForceP/CP complementation and binding. Although I will not explore this more recent version of Landau’s theory here, the
criticisms advanced in this paper appear to apply equally to it.
2
For critical discussion of this and other approaches to Partial Control, see Authier & Reed (to appear).
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(8) a. Professor Smithi T0 wants [ForceP Force0 [ PROi+ to [(PRO) meet after class]]].
|______| |_____________| |__________||____|
Agree
Agree
Agree
Agree
Landau (2004:848)
b. *Professor Smith met after class.
As indicated above, I adopt the opposite view that ForceP complementation correlates with
NOC or, put differently, that FinP complementation results in OC. In other words, I associate (8a)
with the FinP complement structure in (9) and account for PC in the terms suggested in Jackendoff
& Culicover (2003). Namely, the semantic anomaly of sentences like (9) allows for conventionalized coercion of a group argument into the argument structure of PC verbs like want. It is this implicit argument that serves as the antecedent of PRO.
(9) Professor Smith wants [FinP [TP to [vP PRO meet after class]]].
Two final theoretical points warrant discussion before concluding this section. First, (5c)
makes it clear that that Landau, van Urk and I also agree that the reference of PRONOC is determined by pragmatic factors that minimally include logophoricity, topicality, and genericity. Given
space constraints, only logophoricity will be discussed here, although two examples respectively
illustrating the influence of topicality and genericity on the licensing of PRONOC have been provided below in (10) and (11).3
(10) [After PRONOC collecting some money], a bank account was opened by
the/*a landlord.
Inspired by data in Postal (1970).
(11) The policewoman told Tim [that [ PRONOC =arb undressing *herself/*himself/
*themselves/*myself/oneself in public] is strictly forbidden here.
Turning now to logophoricity, this term was coined in Hagège (1974) and refers to the fact
that, in many languages, there are overt pronouns that must refer to the individual whose perspective is being communicated whenever they are embedded in the complement clause of a verb of
saying, knowing, thinking, perceiving, or showing emotion. That is, while the English pronoun is
she in Mary said that she left. may or may not be understood to refer to Mary, its equivalent in the
Aghem example below in (12) must refer to the matrix subject. In other words, in languages like
Aghem, logophoricity is grammaticalized.
(12) Nnsɨnyi dzɛ enyɨa éy/*x
bvʉ nù.
Nsen say that
she.LOG fall.FOC
‘Nseny said that shey/*x fell.’

Butler (2009:2)

Although languages like French and English lack a set of overt logophoric pronouns, Williams (1992) was the first to observe that PRONOC is sensitive to logophoricity since, in many cases, it is only grammatical if it refers to the logophoric center, i.e. the person whose thoughts, feelings, or speech are being reported. His data in (13a-c) make this clear. In (13a), Bill is obviously
the logophoric center, and native speakers report that PRO must be interpreted as referring to him.
In (13b), the same is true of the narrator of the story. Finally, (13c) is unacceptable presumably
because it lacks a logophoric center, making it pragmatically impossible to establish PRO’s reference. Some additional logophoric effects can be seen in (14). What these data establish is that,
although PRONOC does not have its reference syntactically determined, it is still often subject to
obligatory pragmatic control by the logophoric center, a point that will become very important in
Section 3.
(13) a. [PRONOC=x having just arrived in town], the main hotel seemed to Billx to be
the best place to stay.
b. [PRONOC having just arrived in town], the main hotel was a vision indeed.
c. *[PRONOC having just arrived in town], the main hotel collapsed on Bill.
3

For further discussion of PRONOC as a Topic, see Bresnan (1982), Kawasaki (1993), and Adler (2006).
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(14) Cindy told Tim [that [ PRONOC undressing herself/himself/themselves/*myself
in public] was a very bad idea.
This section will conclude with a second area in which there is disagreement between the two
approaches to control under discussion – namely, in how Landau, van Urk, and I view the syntactic status of the understood thematic subject of a passive verb. While Landau and van Urk propose
that this argument is syntactically projected, in the fashion indicated in bold in (15a), I assume that
it is not, as indicated by the lack of a syntactically projected implicit argument in (15b). In fact, I
go even further and follow Parsons (1990), Lasersohn (1993), Bruening (2013), and others in assuming that the passive morphology “deletes” this argument from a verb’s argument structure at
LF, although it does remain interpretively available either because of existential binding, as
Bruening suggests, or because of MPs of the type in (16), as Lasersohn (1993: 159) has argued.
(15) a. Il a
été
IMP
décidé [de PRO
b. Il a
été
décidé [de PRO
it has been
decided of
‘It was decided to establish a new nation.’
(16) "e[ATOM(decide, e) à $x AGENT(x, e)]

fonder
une
fonder
une
to.found a

nouvelle nation].
nouvelle nation].
new
nation

To summarize, the discussion thus far has shown that Landau, van Urk and I disagree on two
key points: the opaque vs. transparent status of ForceP and the projection or non-projection of the
understood agent of a passive verb. In the next section, we turn to five areas in which these differences make opposing empirical predictions.

3 Further Examining the Interaction of Control with Passivization
3.1 Reconsidering Visser’s Effects
Evers (1975) was the first to observe in relation to Dutch that subject control verbs can undergo
impersonal passivization. In other words, impersonal passives are exempt from Visser’s Generalization (Visser 1973), as made clear by the contrast between the impersonal and personal passives
in (17,b).
(17) a. Il a
été
décidé [de PRO fonder une
nouvelle nation].
it has been
decided of
to.found a
new nation
‘It was decided to establish a new nation.’
b. *Paul a
été
menacé [d’PRO intenter un procès contre lui].
Paul has
been
threatened of
to.begin a case against him
*‘Paul was threatened [PRO to initiate legal proceedings against him].’
Landau and van Urk account for this contrast in terms of Agree. They associate (17a-b) with
the structures in (18a-b). (18a) is said to be grammatical because the matrix T does not have to
undergo Agree with the expletive NP, it undergoing merge only to satisfy the EPP. This leaves T
free to agree with the implicit agent and since that is also the semantically designated controller,
the result is well formed. In personal passives like (18b), however, the matrix T must agree with
the overt NP in its Spec in order for that nominal’s case requirements to be satisfied. This means
that that argument is the syntactically designated controller and the result is semantic ill-formed.
In short, Landau and van Urk account for Visser’s effects by assuming that both types of passives
involve OC.
(18) a. Il a
été IMPx
décidé [ForceP de PROx
fonder
une nouvelle nation].
it has been
decided
of
to.found a
new
nation
‘It was decided to establish a new nation.’
b. *Pauly a été IMPx menacé [ForceP d’PROy intenter un procès contre lui].
Paul has been
threatened of
to.begin a case against him

ON VISSER’S EFFECTS, CONTROL, AND WEAK IMPLICIT AGENTS
*‘Pauly was IMPx threatened [ForceP PROy to initiate legal proceedings against him].’
I account for the same facts, but in different terms, associating (18) with the structures in (19).
(19) a. Il a été proposé/décidé [ForceP de PRONOC fonder une nouvelle nation].
it has been proposed/decided
of
to.found a
new
nation
‘It was proposed/decided [ForceP to PRONOC establish a new nation…]’
b. *Pauly a été menace [FinP d’PROy
intenter un procès contre lui].
Paul has been threatened of
to.begin a case against him
*‘Pauly was threatened [FinP PROy to initiate legal proceedings against him].’
Example (19a) is grammatical because the BOC in (7) specifies that ForceP precludes any ccommanding NP from serving as PRO’s antecedent. A configuration of NOC results and the reference of PRO is determined by logophoricity. Since verbs equivalent to propose and decide clearly
designate their thematic subjects as logophoric centers, PRO is understood to refer to the agent of
the passive verb. In contrast, (19b) is ungrammatical because the BOC in (7) designates FinP
complement clauses as contexts of OC. Therefore, in this case, PRO must take as its antecedent
the only c-commanding NP that is available – the NP Paul, which results in semantic illformedness. In short, I agree that personal passives involve OC, but take issue with the claim that
impersonal ones do as well.
Fortunately, it is possible to determine which view is correct. If impersonal passives involve
NOC, then it should be possible to construct atypical pragmatic contexts in which the logophoric
center cannot plausibly serve as the controller and, in these cases, one should find the three signature characteristics of NOC summarized in Landau (2000, 2013). Namely, impersonal passives
should allow arbitrary control, long distance control, and license strict readings under VP-Ellipsis.
The Dutch and French examples below in (20-23), as well as their English translations, collectively show that these predictions are borne out. First, the Dutch impersonal passive and its English
translation in (20) are clearly associated with an arbitrary reading. As one would expect, these
examples of NOC contrast in this respect with the sentence involving OC in (21).
(20) Ik benaderde de selectiecommissie met de vraag
hoe mijn foto
I contacted the selection.committee with the question
how my photo
aan te leveren. ?Er bleek
dat er
(door het comité)
de voorkeur
prt to supply there turned-out that there (by the committee) the preference
aan gegeven wordt [om
deze aan te leveren
in jpeg.
to given is
COMP these prt to supply
in jpeg
‘I contacted the selection committee about how to submit my photo.
It turns out that it’s preferred (by the committeex) [to PROarb submit in jpeg].’
(21) The committeex prefers [to PROx/*arb submit photos in jpeg].
The data in (22a-c) next show that impersonal passives can allow long distance control. As
expected, PROOC in (23) differs from PRONOC in this respect as well.
(22) a. Il n’a
évidemment pas été décidé par les colonsx [de PRONOC=y lesx
it neg.has obviously not been decided by the colonists of
them
taxer à ce point]. C’est bien sûr la royauté qui en
a
décidé ainsi.
to.tax to that point it is well sure the royalty that of.it
has
decided so
‘It was obviously not decided by the colonistsx [to PRONOC=y tax themx at such
a rate]. It was the Crowny.’
b. Il a
été
décidé par la
directionx [de PRONOC=staff ne plus
it has been
decided by the management of
Neg no.longer
utiliser nos ordinateurs pour
faire du
shopping.
to.use our computers for
to.do of.the
shopping
‘It has been decided by management [PRONOC=staff to no longer use computers
to shop].’

164

LISA REED

c. Verbolgen zakenvrouw
aan haar telefoon in Chicago:
irate
businesswoman
on her telephone in Chicago
Waar ben je?
Er was
door
mijn secretaresse
where are you there has.been by
my secretary
geregeld
[om
elkaar
hier in Chicago te ontmoeten].
arranged
COMP each.other here in Chicago to meet
‘Irate businesswoman on her phone in Chicago: Where are you? It was arranged
by my secretaryx [to PRONOC=speaker+listener meet here in Chicago!’
(23) The colonistsx obviously did not decide [to PROx tax *themx/themselvesx
at such a rate]. It was the Crown.
Finally, (24) shows that impersonal passives can license strict readings under VP-Ellipsis. In
this respect, again, PRONOC contrasts with PROOC in (25).
(24) It was proposed by Hillary Clintonx [to PROx be the 2016 Democratic
candidate] and it was by the Democratic National Committee too.
(associated with a strict reading equivalent to It was proposed by the DNC that
Hillary Clinton be their candidate in 2016.)
(25) *Hillary Clintonx proposed [to PROx be the 2016 Democratic candidate] and
the Democratic National Committee did too.
In short, the BOC approach to control achieves improved coverage with respect to impersonal
passives. By making antecedent selection in control structures sensitive to the ForceP/FinP distinction, it can explain why PRO must refer to the understood agent of the passive verb in typical
pragmatic contexts, but may refer to other individuals in atypical ones.
3.2 A Syntactic Constraint on Impersonal Passivization
Turning to a second issue the Landau/van Urk approach faces with respect to impersonal passives,
we next observe that their analysis in (18a) immediately extends to, and hence over-generates, a
large number of sentences of the type in (26):
(26) a. *Il a été
refusé [de PRO discuter du
problème].
it has been
refused of
to.discuss of.the problem
*‘It was refused/declined to comment on the issue.’
b. *Il a été
adoré [PRO
danser toute
la nuit].
it has been
loved
to.dance all
the night
*‘It was loved to dance all night long.’
c. *Il a été
oublié
[d’amener le vin].
it has been
forgotten
of to.bring the wine
*‘It was forgotten to bring the wine.’
The BOC approach accounts for these restrictions if we assume that the verbs in (26) contrast
with those in (19a) in selecting for an infinitival FinP (not ForceP) complement clause. That is, the
BOC in (7) states that any time a matrix verb selects a complement clause “smaller than” ForceP,
a c-commanding NP in the matrix clause must be designated as controller. In the case of passives,
I assume that the thematic subject is entirely unrepresented at LF, so it cannot ever be selected.
This means that only the expletive NP can. Semantic ill-formedness results, since, as Safir (1985:
33-38) was the first to observe in relation to the examples in (27), PRO is inherently non-expletive.
(27) a. [Before PRONOC making a big decision], every option should be considered.
b. *[PRONOC being obvious that John won’t be returning], we can leave.
In sum, the restricted nature of impersonal passivization in languages like French and English
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supports the hypotheses that ForceP creates an opaque domain and that the understood agent of a
passive verb is not represented at LF.
3.3 On an Unexpected Parallel between PROOC and Overt Bound Pronouns
It was observed above that Landau and van Urk make crucial reference to the syntax of control to
account for the absence of a Visser’s effect in impersonal passives (18a) and the existence of one
in personal ones (18b). Namely, agreement of the matrix T with Paul in (18b) precludes T from
agreeing with the implicit agent, resulting in semantic ill-formedness. This control-based account
of Visser’s Generalization (VG) leaves unexplained the fact that overt pronouns, like French on in
(28), appear to be subject to the same constraint since this pronoun is equally unable to take an
understood passive agent as its antecedent. In this case, obviously, no appeal can be made to the
syntax of control.
(28) *Paul a été IMPx assuré [qu’onx le
dédommagerait].
Paul has been
promised that one him.ACC would.compensate
*‘Paul was IMPk promised [that theyk would compensate him].’
(cf. Someonek promised [that theyk would pay him by Friday].)
Before exploring how the BOC approach can handle this, consider first the well-known fact
that other types of implicit arguments, such as the implicit object of signal-type verbs in (29a,b)
are not subject to this restriction. These WIAs can serve as antecedents to overt pronouns and PRO:
(29) a. Jean a fait
signe IMPk [qu’onk devait partir].
Jean has made sign
that one should to.leave
‘John signalled IMPk [that wek should leave].’
b. Jean a fait
signe IMPk [de PROk partir].
Jean has made sign
of
to.leave
‘John signalled IMPk [PROk to leave].’
Interestingly, the implicit agent of the impersonal passive in (30) also contrasts with that of
personal passives in this respect:
(30) Je croyais qu’il
avait
été IMPk
décidé [qu’onk se
I believe that it has
been
decided that one ourselves
à Chicago cette
semaine pour
signer le
contrat].
in Chicago this
week for
to.sign the
contract
‘I believe that it was IM Pk decided/agreed/arranged [that wek would meet
in Chicago this week to sign this contract].’

réunirait
to.meet

These patterns remain mysterious under Landau and van Urk’s analysis, however, they are
expected under the BOC approach. First, if one assumes, contra (28) and (30) above, that the WIA
of a passive is not represented at the LF, then one would expect it to be equally inaccessible to the
theories of binding and control since both are BOCs. This, then, explains why the implicit agent
cannot serve as PRO’s antecedent in (18b) or as on’s antecedent in (28). On the other hand, the
BOC in (7) treats the implicit object associated with verbs in the active voice as being available
(although unprojected) at LF. That is, it has been known since Williams (1985) that this type of
implicit argument is available to the theories of binding and control. His sentence in (31), for example, shows that these arguments trigger Condition C violations, the implicit object of promise
(represented by the index on promised) being unable to refer to the same individual as the Rexpression the doctor. In short, the syntactic availability of the implicit arguments in (29a-b) accounts for the fact that they can serve as antecedents for an overt pronoun or PRO.
(31) *Mary went to the doctor’s office, and she promisedk that the doctork would not
see her again until she was really sick.
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Turning to the grammaticality of (30), this follows from the fact that, the understood agent
of a passive, while syntactically unavailable at LF, nonetheless remains interpretatively available
via MPs or existential binding. A pronoun can, therefore, be pragmatically understood to refer to
that individual, in a fashion akin to PRO in examples like (19a). This option is, however, contingent upon the understood agent been clearly designated as the logophoric center. This explains,
e.g., why this option is available for verbs of saying, knowing, thinking, etc., as in (30), but not for
one like promise in (28). Interestingly, however, even verbs like promise can allow accidental coreference if the context is properly built up, for example, by the introduction of an overt by-phrase,
as in (32) below.4
(32) ?John was promised by Suex [ForceP that shex would bring the money today].
(versus *John was promised by Suex [FinP to PROx bring the money today].)
3.4 On Unexpected WIA Control in Indirect Questions
Landau (2013:159-160) argues that indirect questions offer strong support for his assumptions
summarized in (3a-b). Namely, the matrix subject in (33a-c) is syntactically available; therefore, it
must serve as the controller of PRO, which leads one to expect the Condition B violation in (33a),
the impossibility of long-distance control in (33b), and the absence of a strict reading in (33c).
(33) a. Johni wondered [ForceP who PROi to introduce himselfi/*himi to].
b. *Ik thought that theyi wondered [ForceP how PROi to feed myselfk].
c. Johni remembered [ForceP when PROi to leave], and Bill did too.
(Does not allow a strict reading equivalent to Bill also remembered when John
should leave.)
However, Landau (2013:183) also makes the paradoxical observation that the same constructions are problematic for his and van Urk’s approach to the Visser’s effect in (18b) since, in indirect questions like (34), agreement of was with Mary should preclude was from agreeing with the
WIA, making Mary the controller of PRO. Native speakers, however, report the opposite.
(34) Maryi was [vP IMPk asked [ForceP where PRO*i/k to throw the trash]].
The BOC approach accommodates this range of data since it does not assume uniform ForceP
complementation. Namely, examples like (19b) are analyzed in terms of FinP complementation,
which the BOC identifies as a context of OC by the argument in surface subject position. However,
the presence of a wh-element in (34) indicates that indirect questions involve ForceP complementation, which the BOC treats as a context of NOC. In other words, ForceP bars Mary from serving
as the controller and PRO’s reference is logophorically determined, referring, as usual, to the logophoric center – the understood subject of ask. As one would expect, pragmatic control by the
implicit agent is only a tendency since it is possible to construct atypical contexts that preclude it,
resulting in the absence of a Principle B effect in (35a), licit long distance control in (35b), and a
strict reading under VP-Ellipsis, in (35c).
(35) a. Ton bébéx ne risque pas de savoir [quand PRONOC=z
lex
nourrir].
your baby Neg is.likely not of to.know when
him.acc to-feed
C’est toiz
qui le
sait.
it is
you
who it/acc knows
‘Your babyx doesn’t know [ForceP when to PRONOC=z feed himx]. Youz do!
b. Iz think that my momx has figured out [ForceP where to PRONOC=z+ go on
our honeymoon].
4

Benjamin Bruening (p.c.) has pointed out to me that psuedoclefting is another means of facilitating accidental co-reference in the case of overt pronouns, but not PRO:
(i) That they would pay him on Monday is what John was promised.
(ii) *PRO to pay him on Monday is what John was promised.
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(35) c. Speaker A: I know I’m the only one who can do anything about this
situation, but I just don’t know [ForceP what to PRO to do].
Speaker B: I don’t either. (Allows a strict reading equivalent to
I don’t know what you (= Speaker A) should do either.)
3.5 Apparent Weak Implicit Agent Control in Temporal Adjuncts
Let us conclude this empirical discussion with Landau’s treatment of Roeper (1983, 1987) inspired-examples like (36), which he analyzes as involving NOC. More specifically, OC is assumed to be blocked in temporal adjuncts because predication, the only mechanism that can derive
OC into an island, produces semantically anomalous results since a slot machine is unable to pull a
lever.
(36) The (slot) game was IMP played [by PRONOC pulling the lever on the side
of the machine.]
The problem with this analysis is that it fails to capture the fact that PRO in (36) must refer
to the implicit agent of the passive verb. I.e., the person(s) who played the slot machine clearly
must be the same individuals(s) who pulled the lever. This is unexpected since it is usually possible to construct contexts in which the two are distinct, as is true of (37):
(37) While PRONOC≠ IMP eating fries, I suddenly realized that the game had already been played.
The apparent OC by the implicit agent in (36) follows from the BOC approach if we follow
Williams (1985) and Lasnik (1988) in assuming that there is an event control derivation for whiletype adjuncts. In other words, not only can the main clause surface subject be targeted as a potential controller for PRO, but so too can the event denoted by the TP meaning the game was played
since it also c-commands PRO. Sentence (36) is, therefore, licit on the event control reading because we know that there are events of slot machine playing that typically involve pulling a lever,
just as Williams observes that there are events of game playing that typically involve drinking or
being naked. They are “drinking games” or “nude games” in a metaphorical sense.
If this approach to (36) is correct, then the fact that PRO must refer to the understood agent
of played can be attributed to the interpretative availability of that argument via, e.g., a MP like
(16). That is, if it is actually the event of game playing that serves as the controller of PRO, then it
logically follows that the understood agent of that event must use the lever while playing it. Such
an analysis also explains why sentences like (36) contrast in grammaticality with structurally parallel ones of the type in (38), also due to Roeper. Namely, we adopt Williams’ suggestion that the
event control reading of (38) is ill-formed because one cannot imagine a game that is typically
played while angry at a guy named Bill: There are no “angry at Bill” games.
(38) *The game was played [PRO mad at Bill].

4 Against Control by Weak Implicit Agents
To summarize, Landau and van Urk examine sentences in which passivization interacts with control in order to argue in favor of their view that the implicit agent of a passive undergoes Merge in
the computational system and, by virtue of that fact, takes part in Agree and predication, which are
assumed to determine PRO’s reference. In this paper, I have used a wider range of the same types
of facts to argue in favor of the diametrically opposed views that the agent of a passive is syntactically unrepresented and that control is best handled in terms of a BOC applying at LF.
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